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Abstract
Property  law  usually  reacts  to  encroachments  with  ejectment.  Building 
encroachments  differ,  as  restoring  landowner’s  property claims  implies  the 
reversal of often large costs sustained by the builder. The authority faces thus 
the following dilemma: either it stands by the landowner and faces the social 
costs of undoing  significant investments, or it defends the investment of the 
builder  at  the  cost  of  neglecting  landowner’s  claims.  To  address  building 
encroachments,  national  property laws  have  deployed  interestingly different 
remedies that range from a property rule in favor of the landowner to a property 
rule in favor of the builder with a variety of liability rules in between. The paper 
models  the  builder-owner  conflict  after  the  theory of  optional  law  (Ayres, 
2005), it frames different national solutions into a common analytical setting 
and it evaluates the  different laws in their relative allocative  and distributive 
outcomes. Moreover the paper offers support to the idea that property law may 
implement put-option types of remedies.
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A building  encroachment happens when somebody erects a building  in whole or in part on another's 
real property. Property laws in all  modern legislations solve  conflicts regarding  the attribution and 
enforcement of property entitlements systematically favoring  the owner1 and react to violations by 
means of strong remedies in the form of property rules (Smith, 2004).
However  when someone  builds a  construction by mistake  partly on  an  adjoining  land,  things get 
interestingly more  complicated. Certainly, if the landowner does not enforce  its property right, the 
builder may seek, after a  certain amount of years, to become  owner  under the  doctrine of adverse 
possession. If however the legal conflict between the builder and the landowner arises before adverse 
possession  becomes applicable, then the  law offers other legal means, other than ejectment,  to the 
builder and to the landowner to resolve their conflict. Most civil codes have specific provisions that 
address  cases  of  building  encroachments,  provisions  that  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  inverted 
accession doctrines.2 And the subject has been debated also in common law courts.3 We try to frame 
the issue of building encroachments into an economic model of legal remedies based on optional law. 
The optional approach puts order to the subject that otherwise looks chaotic and offers also normative 
criterions to judge which laws are more efficient. Moreover the paper offers support to Ayres’s (1998) 
claim about the existence of remedies modeled after put options in the law of property; a claim that has 
been so harshly contested by leading property scholars such as Epstein (1998) and Smith (2004). The 
same search for put options in property law has been conducted before also in Nicita et al. (2006) with 
reference to several aspects of the Italian property law. Compared to this previous work the present 
paper focuses only on building encroachments and frames it into a comparative institutional analysis by 
looking  at other legislations as well. There  is a  somewhat contiguous topic in the law & economic 
literature that has received quite some attention: the doctrine of adverse possession.4 We disentangle the 
differences between  the  two areas of the  law further  in the text at section  4.1. To  our knowledge 
however there is no economic analysis of provisions specifically addressing  building  encroachments. 
This is somewhat puzzling as, in addressing some shortcomings and rough edges of adverse possession 
statutes,  scholars have  advanced proposals5  that closely resemble  the  rules analyzed  in this paper 
overlooking the fact that similar provisions were already present in the law.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we will model the builder owner conflict in a 
optional framework as devised by Ayres (2005) and we will construct archetypal remedies available to 
our hypothetical authority. The menu of rules is the one devised by Calabresi & Melamed (1972) and 
1 The stability and reliability of owners claims over their estates is considered to be -from Bentham (1789) on- the backbone 
of  the  modern liberal statehood that promotes development by letting people  appropriate the  fruits   of  their  works and 
investments (Rose, 2000). Non consensual appropriation is thus severely deterred by means of strong remedies: for instance 
trespass allows for damages and injunctive relief; theft is also a crime; and encroachments are mendable with ejectment.
2 According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) accession is a “property owner's right to all that is added to the property 
(especially land) naturally or by labour, including land left by floods and improvements made by others”. Conversely, under 
the doctrine of  inverted  accession  (accessione invertita in Italy, accessió  invertida in Spain) the owner of  the building 
acquires landowner’s property and not the other way around.
3 See cases cited in note 23 and following notes.
4 See Netter et al. (1998) Ellickson (1986), Merrill (1985) and Miceli and Sirmans (1995)
5For instance Merrill (1985) suggests the application of a liability rule II instead of  a property rule III in case of  bad-faith 
adverse  possession and Kim (2003) suggests to make  the  granting of  adverse possession dependent upon a standard of 
monitoring effort to be fulfilled by the landowner.enriched by Ayres & Goldbart (2001). We will later on formulate normative criteria that will allow us to 
rank the rules in terms of both allocative efficiency and distributive justice.
 Thereafter we  will  look at how building  encroachments are  actually regulated in  several  relevant 
legislations and we will pigeonhole the laws into our schedule of theoretical rules and judge them in 
accordance with our normative criteria.
2 A theory of building encroachments
We model the encroachment case as a bilateral monopoly with asymmetric information. The builder 
encroaches the landowner’s property and puts its structure in place within sometime. The parties go to 
court to seek enforcement of their respective claims over the rival entitlement. The resource with rival 
use is obviously the surface occupied by the building. The landowner claims the property of the land. 
The  builder, assumed  being  in good  faith, may want landowner’s claims to  be  dismissed  or,  after 
realizing that the encroachment has actually happened, she may want to compromise on a solution in 
order not to undue her investments in the building. Note that the impairment suffered by the landowner 
is immediate and provokes a discontinuity in her evaluation of the occupied land; however the value of 
the  same  to  the  builder grows monotonically with time  as its investments in the  building  become 
unreversible. The more she builds on the wrong land, the higher the value of the unlawfully occupied 
land becomes to her, and the more expensive the outside option of building on the right land becomes. 
The time frame is important because, as we will see later, it might induce the landowner to wait and try 
to hold-up the builder later on when more costs are sunk.
Each party of the conflict knows her own evaluation of the surface of land. vB is the value to the builder 
and may be based on the sunk costs of the investment, and on her expectations of the investment rents. 
vL is the evaluation of the landowner and may be based on the productivity of land as an agricultural 
input, its rental value or some idiosyncratic evaluation that landowners attach to their proprieties.6 Due 
to reciprocal asymmetric information each of them only knows the distribution of other’s evaluation 
fB(v)  and  fL(v)  with  mean  value  µB  and  µL  and  variance  σB  and  σL  respectively.  The  information 
asymmetry exists also between the parties and the court: as the court does not know vB  and vL but only 
the mean of the respective distributions µB and µL.
2.1 A taxonomy of theoretical legal remedies
Hereinafter we characterize the different rules that can be deployed by the authority in allocating the 
entitlement between the builder and the landowner. In doing so we refer to the literature on remedies 
that has spurred from Calabresi and Melamed (1972) and in particular to the paradigmatic advances 
brought upon from the mid 90s on, thanks to the adoption of the optional theory borrowed from the 
analysis of financial derivatives7.
6 This idiosyncratic valuation may for instance be due to the endowment effect (Jacques, 1992). Note that Stake (2001) 
justifies adverse possession on the ground of the endowment effect: a person that possesses continuously the land for often a 
couple of  decades has certainly developed the endowment effect –he argues- whereas the legal owner has probably lost it if 
he does not even dare to control the state of  her properties. This simple shift of  effect from the owner to the encroacher 
should tilt  the  decision  of  court to  attribute  the  land to  the  party with a  –now  thans to the  endowment effect-  higher 
evaluation of the land.
7 In this literature we shall mention in particular Krier and Schwab (1995) Kaplow and Shavell (1995; 1996), Ayres  and 
Talley (1995b; 1995a), Ayres and Balkin (1996), Ayres and Goldbart (2001) and Ayres (2005). The court decides both to whom to allocate the entitlement between the two parties of the conflict, and 
decides upon which remedy to deploy to enforce its decision. In the original Calabresi and Melamed 
framework, remedies were grouped in property rules and liability rules. In the realm of property law, a 
property  rule  type  of  remedy  confers  to  the  entitled  party  a  strong  protection  forbidding  any 
interference with the owner’s rights by other parties. A liability rule instead, allows the counterpart to 
access  the  entitlement  upon  the  payment  of  damages  established  by  a  court.  The  optional 
characterization of the Calabresi and Melamed framework reinterprets liability rules as call options: 
saying that the court determines that the builder can access the landowner’s property upon the payment 
of damages is equivalent to saying that the builder is given a call-option over landowner’s entitlement 
that can be exercised at the strike price of damages. The next step is to imagine put-option like liability 
rules: that is to say remedies that confer to one party both the holding of the entitlement and the power 
of forcing the counterpart to buy it at the strike price of damages. In Ayres and Godbart (2001) jargon, 
the  option-holder  is  the  chooser  and  the  counterpart that may be  paid  damages (or  maintain  the 
entitlement) depending on the chooser’s will is the non-chooser.
How are damages as option’s exercise price determined? Damages awarded by the court are meant at 
compensating one party for the loss suffered. Given that the court does not usually know the exact 
valuation of the parties, it sets D=µB  if the landowner pays damages to the builder and D=µL if it is the 
other  way  around.  Of  course,  damages  may  be  computed  in  other  ways,  however  this  way  of 
computing damages is both positively descriptive –as the authority compensates at its best the victim 
for the loss suffered- and normatively efficient as this amount maximizes social welfare8.
Let us now go back to the rules with the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) categorization:
Rule I: The authority orders the restitution of the land to the landowner.
This is a standard property rule. The authority acknowledges that the landowner is entitled to the land 
and orders the builder to remove the construction and (maybe) pay a sanction for encroachment (and/or 
for not respecting  the court's injunction not to trespass). Under rule I, total payoffs are given by the 
evaluation of the entitlement by the builder that is equal, on average, to µL.
Rule II. The authority orders the builder to choose between a) restituting the land or b) keeping the 
land and paying damages
This is the  optional  characterization  of  the  traditional  liability rule.  The  authority recognizes  the 
owner’s entitlement to the land, however it does not order the builder to demolish but allows her to 
maintain the building upon the payment of damages. In optional words, the court confers a call option 
to  the  builder,  option  that she  can exercise  over the owner’s entitlement at the strike price  of the 
damage amount. If the builder’s private evaluation is higher than the damage amount, she will choose 
b)  exercising  the  call  option,  allocating  the land  to herself,  paying  damages, and  still  gaining  the 
difference vB-D.
Given the distribution fB(vB), the option value for the builder is 
8 See Kaplow and Shavell (1996). To see why, suppose that the court opts for a rule II (see further in the text) and sets D=µL. 
The  builder  will therefore take  only  when her  own  valuation  is  higher  than  the  average  evaluation  of  the landowner. 
Suppose instead that D<µL, then transfers would happen for values below landowner’s average evaluation, meaning that in 
some cases the entitlement would be moved from the party that values it more (the landowner) to the low valuing party (the 
builder). Conversely, with D>µL the landowner would retain the entitlement also in certain cases for which her evaluation is 
lower than the builder’s one. Therefore optimal damages D=µL maximize the number of Pareto improving transactions and 
thus social welfare. We have previously argued that optimal damages should be set equal to the mean evaluation of the non-
choosing  party. In this case  the  non-chooser  is the  landowner and  her  mean  evaluation is µL, and 
therefore the value of the option under a rule II is  . 
If the builder’s evaluation is below the damage amount she will opt for (a), thus returning the land. In 
this case the landowner regains an entitlement that she evaluates on average µL. If the builder opts for 
(b) the landowner is compensated exactly with µL. 
Then total payoffs under a liability rule II are 
Rule III: The authority orders the builder to maintain the land and orders the landowner to dismiss 
her claims.
This rule is the reverse of rule I. The court transfers the ownership of the land to the builder. 
Under a rule III, total payoffs are: E(π rule III)=µB
Rule IV: The authority orders the landowner to decide between a) giving up her claims or b) paying 
the builder to have the land returned.
Optimal damages should be set equal to µB. If the landowner evaluates the entitlement less than µB  she 
opts for (a) and the builder retains an entitlement worth to her on average µB. If the landowner opts for 
(b) she gains on average 
Total payoffs are thus: 
Rule V: The authority orders the landowner to comply with builder’s decision of either a) keep the land 
(in this case the landowner must dismiss her claims) or b) restitute the land (in this case the landowner 
must pay damages)
In optional terms, the court confers to the builder both the entitlement and the put option that can be 
exercised at the strike price of the mean landowner’s evaluation µL. If vB>µL then the builder  opts for 
(a) keeps the entitlement, otherwise she opts for (b), sells the entitlement and collects µL. 
Total expected payoffs for Rule V are 
Rule VI: The authority orders the builder to comply with landowner’s decision of either a) having the 
land restituted (in this case the builder must dismiss her claims) or b) keep the land (in this case the 
builder must pay damages)
The court gives the entitlement to the landowner as well as a put option to force the builder to buy the 
land at the  strike  price  of  her  mean  evaluation µL. The landowner  keeps the  entitlement if  vL>µB 
otherwise it sells the entitlement and collects µB. 
Total expected payoffs for Rule VI are:   Rule VII: The authority orders the builder to 1) pay initial lump-sum damages and 2) then decide 
whether to a) return the land or b) keep it and pay additional compensatory damages.
Under rule VII the authority gives the entitlement to the landowner, the call option to the builder and 
obliges the  builder to  transfer  an amount T of money to  the  landowner before her final  allocative 
decision. Then, if vB<µL, she opts for a) and return the land to the landowner. If vB>µL the builder keeps 
the land, transfers µL to the landowner and gains  .
The landowner in case (a) gets T and the entitlement of average value µL and in case of (b) she gets the 
transfer T plus transfer µL
The initial lump sum transfer from the builder to the landowner does not necessarily zero the expected 
payoffs9 for the builder but it is at least over compensatory for the landowner in respect to a simple rule 
II without affecting its allocative incentives. Rule VII has some interesting proprieties: the builder pays 
something to the landowner regardless of its decision. The rule biases the distribution further in favour 
of the landowner in such a way as to compensate her fully for the loss of control over the entitlement. 
In a sense it reaches a distributive outcome that is the opposite of the put implementation of rule V 
where the builder has both the entitlement and the option. Nevertheless incentives to take or not to take 
for the builder are the same, and still the builder only takes whenever her evaluation is greater than the 
average evaluation of the landowner.
As for rule II and rule V, total payoffs are 
although they are redistributed differently between the builder and the landowner.
Rule VIII. The authority orders the builder to 1) pay initial lump-sum damages and 2) comply with 
landowner’s decision to a) having the land restituted (in this case the builder must dismiss her claims) 
or b) keep the land (in this case the builder must pay additional compensatory damages)
Rule VIII has both the put option and all of the payoffs assigned to the landowner and thus it is very 
favourable to her. In fact the builder is likely left with a negative payoff (unless vB≥µB+T). Since rule 
VIII is a landowner as the chooser rule total payoffs will be equal to the one produced by rules IV and 
VI. 
Damages amount and allocation
 (who should pay what)
Payoffs
Builder Landowner Builder Landowner
Rule I - - 0 µL
9 In the original formulation of the pay or pay rule in Ayres and Goldbart (2001) initial damages T are set equal to the value 
of  the option   to be exercised by the builder. When the builder opts for (b), the landowner gets µL + 
 while if she opts for (a) the landowner keeps something she evaluates on average µL plus the initial 
transfer. In either case the landowner appropriates all payoffs of the transaction. It should be noted that the task the authority 
is asked to accomplish -tailoring the amount of damages on the value of the call for the builder- is cumbersome: if the court 
can really  compute the  value  of  the  option, it means that  it  knows the  private  evaluation of  the  builder and thus the 
information harvesting effect of  liability rules (see Kaplow andShavell, 1996) is forgone since the allocative choice of the 
chooser reveals an information the court already knows. Knowing the private evaluation of  parties, the court can directly 
allocate it to the one who values it the most.Rule II µL µL
Rule III - - µB 0
Rule IV µB µB
Rule V µL µL+ 0
Rule VI µB 0 µB+
Rule VII T+µL -T T+µL
Rule VIII T+µB -T
µB+T+ 
Figure 1: In the second and third columns we show which party ought to pay damages and transfers 
according to each rule. In the last two columns, we show how total payoffs are distributed between the 
two parties. 
Notice that total payoffs under Rule II, Rule V and Rule VII – when the builder is the chooser- are the 
same. So it is for Rule IV, VI and VIII –when the landowner is the chooser- although the payoffs are 
distributed strikingly different under either the put and call implementation of the two groups of rules. 
The  same  level  of  social  welfare  is  achieved  under  opposite  distributive  outcomes,  this  only by 
choosing the remedies either in the form of put call or other more complex rules (such as rule VII and 
rule VIII described above). 
These eight theoretical rules will be used later on to analyze the way different national laws address   
building encroachments. It should be noted that the theory of optional law developed by Ayres & co-
authors allows the  construction  of  rules for each  possible division between the  parties of  the total 
payoffs with both put and call implementations of the same allocative outcomes.10
2.2 Normative criteria to rank the rules 
The analysis developed by Ayres and Goldbart (2001) not only offers a rich menu of liability rules the 
authority can pick from, but also proposes a normative criterion to choose the rule that best maximizes 
social  welfare. The  recipe  of  optional  law is that,  in order to maximize  social  welfare  i)  optimal 
damages should  be  set equal  to the entitlement’s evaluation of  the  non-choosing  party and ii) the 
decision to choose  (and therefore  the  put or call  option) should go to the  party that has the most 
speculative evaluation of the entitlement (see appendix 1 for the derivation of the results). 
A normative efficiency criterion.   Optional law suggests to adopt a rule that confers the choice of 
final allocation to the most efficient chooser. Who, between the builder and the landowner, is the most 
efficient chooser? If the answer to this question must be given case by case, then optional law becomes 
burdensome to courts. In fact we can easily notice that all rules stylized above are potentially efficient 
10 This is is the “convexity” result of  Ayres and Godbart (2001). The authors demonstrate the theoretical existence of  a 
double continuum, one for call and one for put implementation, of rules that without affecting the allocative decision of the 
chooser, distributes smoothly the expected joint payoffs between the parties.depending on certain assumptions11 and therefore judges must gain knowledge of private evaluations of 
the parties. Therefore the relevant question becomes: is there any specific characteristic of the cases of 
building encroachments that can lead us to consider the builder regularly as a better chooser vis-à-vis 
the landowner (or vice versa) and therefore lead us to consistently choose a rule over another in terms 
of allocative efficiency? 
We  argue that builders have more  speculative  evaluations than landowners. It seems reasonable to 
argue  that the  builder has a more  speculative evaluation  of the  entitlement, that is to say that the 
distribution of the evaluation of the builder has a higher variance vis-à-vis the one of the landowner 
(σB>σL). This is because builder’s expectations of future returns are based on a risky investment while 
the landowner usually has a past consistent stream of income to measure with. More important, one 
may argue that the construction business is usually more speculative and uncertain than the businesses 
linked with the use of the land, especially if used for agricultural purposes. 12
If the builder is the party that has the more speculative evaluation of the entitlement, than she is the one 
that, on average, triggers the generation of higher joint payoffs and, therefore, the authority should pick 
a rule that delegates her the decision over the final allocation: namely either a Rule II, a Rule V or a 
Rule VII. Rules that have the landowner as the chooser (IV, VI and VIII) generate inferior aggregate 
payoffs and the two property rules (I, III) still lower ones.
A normative equity criterion. Optional  law offers us guidance on how to pick the correct rules in 
terms  of  efficient allocation  and  leave  us choice  in  terms of  which  rule  achieves an  unspecified 
distributive goal. Which one of the three efficient rules mentioned above should be picked depends on 
the distributive concerns of the authority. Prima facie, there seems to be a strong argument to favor the 
landowner;  after  all,  she  suffered  an  impairment  and  may  be  forced  to  give  up  the  land  non-
consensually without having held any active role on her side to make the encroachment arise. The rule 
11 At a first glance, one might think that property rules are always less efficient than liability rules because they lack any 
option and the relative value to its holder. However in the limit case for which the variance of  the distribution is zero, the 
value of the option is also zero and the property rule is as efficient as the liability rule.
12 An alternative normative ranking criterion could -someone may argue- be derived from the observation that landowners 
have  higher evaluations of their lands. Landowners after  all, -so the argument may proceed- are  the  ones that have the 
greatest evaluation of their land, not least because if it were otherwise they would have transacted it away. Strong defense of 
land property is often based on the presumed superior capacity of owners to evaluate the risks of their investments in land 
(Smith, 2004) and also to the idiosyncratic value they attach to their property (see also note 6). In more formal terms this 
alternative hypothesis implies that µL>µB, that is to say that at least on average, landowners have an higher evaluation of the 
land vis-à-vis builders. We  also hypothesize  σB=σL  not least because otherwise  it would not be alternative to our  main 
criterion. What does this mean in terms of our ranking of rules?
We have seen how the relative efficiency of putting the option in the hands of the builder or the landowner does not depend 
upon the means of the two distributions. And given the fact that the variance is the same, then also the value of the options, 
regardless of  their peculiar implementations is the same. Therefore  we cannot assess which rule is best as all rules look 
equally efficient (although they distributional outcomes are obviously different). There is one limit case: assuming that the 
evaluation of parties are precisely known (so vL=µL and vB=µB and also µL>µB) then a property rule I that leaves the property 
in the  hand of  the landowner is what it is needed to achieve  first best allocations under the assumption that there is no 
bargaining in the shadow of the law, otherwise even Rule III is equally efficient. Indeed, even under any other liability rule 
with damages set at the non-chooser mean value, the allocation would be exactly the same (in fact if there is no variance in 
the evaluation, the option is not valuable any longer) thus property rules may be preferable because of lower administrative 
costs (Calabresi andMelamed, 1972; Smith, 2004). However, it seems quite  implausible that the  court perfectly knows 
private  evaluations and that the  private  evaluations of  landowners always exceed the  one  of  builders. To conclude, we 
cannot derive a ranking criterion from the hypothesis that that landowners’ evaluations exceed on average builders’ ones 
(with equal variance). We have seen that this hypothesis does not offer guidance to single out efficient rules as all rules are 
equally efficient except for case where landowner’ valuation is known to be exceeding builder’s one with certainty by the 
court (a fairly strict assumption); a case for which a rule I achieves first best allocation.more favourable to the landowner is Rule VIII that confers her the put option as well as the lump sum 
transfer in addition  to  damages. At the  bottom  end  of the  rank there  is Rule V  that deprives the 
landowner of the entitlement to the land and subdues her to builder’s allocative will.
Given  our two normative  criteria, the  rules can be  ranked  in allocative  terms (with builder as the 
chooser  rules dominating  both the  landowner as the  chooser ones  and the  property rules)  and in 
distributive terms (ordering them according to which ones are more favorable to the landowner) as in 
Figure 2.

















Figure  2:  In the  first column the rules are ranked according  to an allocative  criterion  (under the 
assumption that the builder is the more efficient chooser and that the builder and the landowner have 
the same mean evaluation) and in the second column they are ordered also according to a distributive 
criterion with the most favorable rules to the landowner on top.
To conclude the paragraph, we have formulated two reasonable normative criterion for ranking rules: 
the first one –based on the assumption that builder have more speculative evaluations- leverages on 
optional  law and allows us to rank the  rules in efficiency terms. The second one  is based  on the 
straightforward equity consideration that blameless landowners should not be left worse off. We have 
now a normative ranking of theoretical rules that will help us to evaluate the efficiency of national laws 
as they are going to be disentangled in the next section.
3 Building encroachments in different national laws
We  have so far presented an entire menu of rules that a hypothetical authority may use in order to 
allocate  an  entitlement efficiently and  also  in  accordance  with  some  pre-determined  distributional 
preferences.  We  now  look  at  how  different  national  legislations  address  cases  of  building 
encroachments.  We  refer  specifically to  some  civil  law  legislations  such  as  the  French,  German, 
Norwegian, Swiss, Portuguese and Italian rules and to the American rules as well. In analyzing building encroachment laws we see a variety of rules across different legislations that cover almost the entire 
spectrum of optional rules presented before.
In  addressing  building  encroachments,  remedies  range  from  stringent  protection  of  landowners’ 
property rights,  to  fictious  contracts  such  as  easements  or  leases  and  the  subsequent  payment  of 
permanent damages calculated with a  great deal  of creativity, to  forced  sell  of the  land. Although 
substantive property law is remarkably constant across different legal systems (Mattei, 2000), this is a 
corner where we see a peculiar variation. We here present a synthesis of the rules of some countries 
both of civil law and common law traditions. The codes, which the synthetic rules are built upon, are 
presented in the appendix 2. 
French law. Rule I 
 There is no distinction between encroaching buildings emanating from a builders’ property and those 
erected  entirely  on  landowner’s  property.  Therefore  the  stringent  property  rules  in  favor  of  the 
landowner usually apply13. The French law is a simple property rule I. We have seen that it can be 
efficient only under the  assumption that µL>µB  and that the  evaluations are  precisely known by the 
court. If this is the case, the court assigns the land directly to its most efficient user. Under less stringent 
assumptions however, property rules are dominated in terms of efficiency by all other liability rules 
(Kaplow  andShavell,  1996;  Ayres,  2005).  In  distributional  terms,  the  rule  obviously  favors  the 
landowner, however, both rule VI and rule VII would achieve higher welfare and a distribution more 
favorable to the landowner than rule I itself.
Italian law. t0) Rule I. If conditions [a) emanating building b) good faith c) 3 months elapsed] are all 
met then t1) either Rule VII or VIII are applied. Damages:twice the market value; T:compensation for 
damages.
The landowner can eject the builder within three months from the beginning of the construction (Rule 
I). After this period, and under the presumption of good faith, the court can assign the occupied land to 
the builder and force her to pay damages to the landowner. Therefore both the builder can ask the judge 
to force the landowner to sell the land (rule VI) and also the landowner can ask the judge to force the 
builder to  buy the property (rule  VIII). As a rule VI,  the Italian law confers the  decision  over the 
allocation of the entitlement to the builder that is the most efficient chooser. Used as a rule VIII instead, 
it achieves lower allocative outcomes as it rests on the decision of the landowner. The use of the Italian 
13 The Spanish code is equally strong on the applicability of  a straight property rule I (see rule included in the appendix). 
However, there seems to be a large gap between what the civil code says (it mandates the straight application of Rule I) and 
what judges actually do in courts where they usually apply rule II  if the following conditions are met: a) the building must 
be  built  for  its large  part  on the  builder’s own property; b)  the destruction of  the  part  of  the  encroaching building is 
uneconomical; c) the value of the building must largely exceed the value of   the occupied land; d) the builder was in good-
faith. (Peña Bernaldo De Quirós, 2001, pg 227). See also Roldán (1985).rule as a put-option can be understood in distributional terms since the rule VIII confers all payoffs to 
the landowner. 14 
Damages are set by the law at “double the value  of  the area occupied as well as compensation for 
damages” The damage measure can be divided in two parts: the doubled value is the exercise price of 
the option the compensation for damages is the lump-sum transfer that must be paid even if the builder 
eventually  returns  the  land.  The  damage  measure  is  very  favorable  to  the  landowner.  A  large 
compensation is not necessarily an inefficient idea: if the builder faces a rule VII, she transfers to the 
landowner more wealth than optimal damages, however she does so without affecting her allocative 
decision since part of this wealth is transferred regardless of the decision. The Italian rule however have 
both the double damages that are transferred only if land is taken and the fixed damages transferred 
regardless. The  lump sum  transfer thus looks fine both from the allocative and distributive point of 
view but the doubled market price measure is arguably overcompensatory: it causes builders to take too 
few times. 
Swiss law. t0) Rule I. If conditions [a) emanating building b) good faith c)mannerless time elapsed] are 
all met then t1) if [d)negligible impairment] than Rule III otherwise Rule II. Damages:adequate. 
The landowner can eject the builder only if it acts in a timely manner (property rule I). Otherwise, and 
presuming she acted in good faith, the builder can obtain an easement for negligible encroachments 
(property rule III) and force the landowner to sell the property against adequate compensation for larger 
encroachments (liability rule II). Damages are meant to be “adequate”.
The Swiss rule seems to privilege the allocative aspect of building encroachments. In fact when the lost 
is  negligible  for  the  landowner,  the  transfer  is  simply set  via  a  property rule  III  and  when  the 
encroachment is more substantial, the landowner cannot aspire to obtain anything more than adequate 
damages under a rule II; a rule–we have seen- among  the best in allocative terms but not the most 
favorable to the landowner.
Portuguese law. t0) Rule I. If conditions [a) emanating building b) good faith c) 3 months elapsed] are 
all met then t1) Rule VI. Damages:value of the land+ devaluation –if existent- of the remaining land; 
T=repair for the resulting prejudice.
 The landowner can eject the builder within three months (rule I). After that and under the assumption 
of good faith, the builder can force the landowner to sell the land (rule VI). The formulation of the 
damage measure is particularly detailed and can be disentangled in the exercise price set at the value of 
the  land and as well as compensation for the devaluation –if existent- of  the remaining land while 
damages  that  repair  for  the  resulting  prejudice  must  be  paid  regardless  of  whether  the  builder 
eventually buys. 
14 Under Italian Law, also the  state  (and not only private citizens) can acquire property through the institute of  inverted 
accession (see the Supreme Court of Cassation ruling n.1464 of  26-feb-1983 and n. 8597 of 29-aug-1998). It is technically 
distinct from expropriation (taking).  It is worth noticing that, in such circumstances there is no need for the state to prove 
the emanation of the accession from an adjoin property.  Moreover, the state does not pay double damages as would be the 
case for a private party under art. 938. CC but the much lower compensation envisaged by the norms on takings. If  our 
intuition (see further in the text at section 4) that the requisite of emanation is a filter against the opportunistic use of the law 
by the builder is true, somebody supporting the idea of  a benevolent state may argue that –correctly- this requisite is not 
necessary when the “builder” happens to be the public authority. However, inverted accession has been often used as a 
shortcut in order to circumvent some safeguards for the landowner embedded in the norms on takings. Thanks to Maurizio 
Pontani for the pointerNorwegian  Rule15.  t0)  Rule  I.  If  conditions  [a)  emanating  building  b)  good  faith  c)costs  of 
keeping<benefits of destroying] are all met then t1) either Rule II or VI are applied. Damages:damage 
or nuisance incurred.
 The landowner is granted a property rule I unless the removal or correction of the building entails 
expenses and losses that are disproportionate to the benefits gained and unless the builder operated in 
good faith. If both conditions apply, then both the builder and the landowner can force the transfer of 
the entitlement to the builder (by mean of an easement) respectively by asking the authority to apply a 
Rule II and/or a rule VI. Damages are set at the measure of compensatory damages, however if the 
structure was originally placed unlawfully on the neighbouring property then damages are set at gain-
stripping  level in such a  way as to make the builder disgorges all the gains from the  encroaching 
building. The Norwegian law stands out for this explicit cost-benefit test that -if passed- triggers the 
switch between a property rule I and one of the two liability rules. 
German rule. t0) Rule I. If conditions [a) emanating building b)builder in good faith c) builder not in 
gross negligence d) landowner did not object before or immediately after] are all met then t1) either 
Rule II or VI  are applied.  Damages for rule  II:compensatory damages; damages for Rule  VI:land 
market value at the time of the encroachment.
If the  landowner fills an objection before  or immediately after the encroachment, it can obtain the 
ejection of the builder (rule I). If it fails to object and under the presumption that the builder is in good 
faith and absent gross negligence, the builder may retain the building by paying annual damages (rule 
II).  The landowner can force the sell of the occupied land and recover the value of the land at the time 
of the encroachment (rule V).
The German law, similarly to the Italian and Norwegean, envisages the use of both a put option and a 
call option: while the first one is preferable under an allocative point of view, the implementation of the 
second can be supported by distributional considerations. Note that while under rule II the builder must 
pay annual compensatory damages that can be waived by contract, under the rule VI the landowner can 
force the purchase of the land to be recorded in the land registered. Although this difference might be 
minimal in economic terms, its legal ratio shows how the law has strong distributional preferences for 
the  landowner  (conferring  her  a  put option)  and  imposes  upon  her  the  duty to  tolerate  builder’s 
encroachment only as long as it is strictly necessary (rule II ceases when the encroachment ceases as 
well). 
American rule. 
The American rule is here stylized upon the Corpus Juris Secundum’s synthesis of dozens of cases and 
statutes. As such the boundaries of the rule are wide and cover the declinations that all other rules take. 
It is thus difficult to use the American rule to assess its distributive and allocative implications as all 
cases under each statute and national precedent would need to be disentangled. 
As a general matter, what can be derived by the Corpus Juris Secundum is that the judge does not 
recognize landowners the typical property remedies (rule I) such as ejectment if any of the following 
conditions hold: the encroachment is slight, there is no evidence that the defendant acted willfully, the 
encroachment was due mainly to a predecessor in title of the defendant, or the burden of removing the 
encroachment substantially outweighs the benefit, an order to remove the encroachment is improper. In 
all these cases liability rules in the form of easement, lease and damages are granted. There can be 
several damage measures: if damages are permanent, they can be set equal to the difference in value of 
15 I must thank Endre Stavang for the pointerthe land with and without the building  encroachment. If they are temporary they could resemble the 
reasonable rental  value  for the land. They are however flexible as to be  as much compensatory as 
possible.
4 Searching for the best solution to building encroachments
There certainly are many similar characteristics and commonalities that are worth emphasizing and are 
schematized in Figure 3. 
Emanation: There is a difference if the building is wholly or only partly erected on the neighbour’s 
land,  thus  on  whether  it  emanates from  a  legitimate  construction  or  it  is  a  stand-alone  unlawful 
structure built entirely on other’s land. In all codes analyzed, there exist general provisions that address 
the case of structures entirely built on someone else property and they all threat them severely as the 
French law. However all legislations, except the French one, have specific provisions for the subset of 
encroachments that emanate from a construction on an adjoin land.
The Norwegian rule stands apart: a liability rule still applies to stand alone structures but damages are 
set at a  gain-stripping  measure  instead of  a  compensatory one.  Gain-stripping  measures  are  more 
punitive for the builder and usually back property rules type of  remedies. Therefore, although the rule 
is technically a liability rule, its goals more closely resemble the ones of property rules (Rizzolli, 2008).
Why is the special treatment of the encroachment granted conditional to the emanation requirement? It 
is  arguable  that  the  emanation  condition  reinforces  the  credibility of  the  non-strategic  use  of  the 
encroachment by the builder: while it is reasonable that a neighbor slightly encroaches by mistake, it is 
unlikely that a neighbor or even less a stranger happens to build by mistake entirely on one’s property. 
Absent this condition, the builder could try to build on other’s land hazarding that the landowner would 
not notice it in time to seek ejectment. The condition of emanation thus limits the opportunism of the 
builder.
Intentionality: In order to obtain any favorable measure (something that is not ejectment), the builder 
must have acted with good faith. How is it possible to erect a structure by mistake? This may occur due 
to incorrect surveys, guesses or miscalculations by the builders and/or the  landowner16. Usually the 
burden of proving  that the builder was not in good faith rests on the landowner. The requirement of 
good faith prevents the builder from strategically anticipating the granting  of a liability rule and thus 
using  encroachments as a  mechanism  of appropriating  the  landowner’s property non consensually. 
Good faith implies that the builder has not acted with the purpose of forcing the landowner to sell but 
only as a  consequence  of a  mistake  (see  also note  19). The good  faith condition  again limits the 
opportunism of the builder.
Time: Usually, the more time elapses between the beginning of the construction and the objection of 
the landowner, the less likely the landowner is to obtain the full property rule I. After a relatively short 
amount of time (three months in the case of the Italian and Portuguese case, immediately after in the 
German one), the property rule switches to one of the liability rules. The ratio seems to imply that, after 
a reasonable amount of time, the builder may have operated non-trivial and irreversible investments 
and therefore it would be socially wasteful to mandate it to undo the building all together. Better weight 
these costs against the costs for the landowner of giving up her entitlement and being compensated for 
the loss suffered. Absent this condition, a landowner may find convenient to wait for the builder to 
accumulate specific investments and then seek to hold her up by treating  ejectment. Conversely, the 
16 Notice that the German rule also adds gross negligence to the factors limiting the applicability of the rule.short time limit induces the landowner to come up early if she wants to maintain the land or wait and 
seek instead monetary compensation. Contrary to the previous ones, the short time condition serves the 
purposes of keeps in check the potential opportunistic behavior of the landowner.
Relevance and cost-benefit test. The more negligible is the encroachment for the landowner and the 
more burdensome is the removal of the encroachment for the builder, the more likely the encroachment 
will  be  remedied via  a  liability rule.  This variable  is explicitly considered  in  both  the  Swiss and 
American  rules.  A  more  sophisticated  variant,  that  considers  the  costs  of  destroying  builder’s 
investment  to  be  weighted  against  the  gains  of  restoring  landowner’s  property is  present in  the 
Norwegean law. In both variants, the ratio seems pretty much straightforward: the more negligible is 
the encroachment, the more the costs of undoing the investments must be weighted against in terms of 
social welfare. However there might be a slight difference upon whose opportunistic behavior the two 
conditions are meant at. The relevance condition seems to target the landowner willing to make a great 
deal out of a negligible encroachment while the cost-benefit test seems to be also meant at builders 
whose  encroachments are less valuable  than  the  impairment they caused and nevertheless want to 
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Figure  3: In this table we  can  recognize some  patterns between the rules as well  as the  main 
differences.
 Amount of damages. Damages are computed in many ways. We must however distinguish between 
those damages transferred regardless of the final allocation of the entitlement from those that need to be 
paid only if the  ownership eventually changes.  As  for  the  former  type,  this lump-sum  transfer  is 
envisaged by both the Italian and the Portughese laws and it is computed for instance by looking at the 
damages suffered during the temporary impairment. As for the later type, we have previously seen how 
optimal damages should be based on the non-chooser mean valuation of the entitlement. This can be 
approximated by a standard compensatory measure of damages that is often found in the laws here 
analyzed (see in particular the Swiss and Portughese laws). Other laws seem to favor a market value 
measure of damages: a measure that refers to a recurrent price of the land practiced by intermediaries. 
Both  ways have  their  arguments for and  against. Determining  exact compensation of  idiosyncratic 
values is a  daunting  task  for  authorities especially, when they attempt to compensate  idiosyncratic 
valuations that are often attached to long lasting ownership of land. On the other hand, a market value 
is difficult to assess in thin markets characterized by low homogeneity and substitutability of traded 
goods  such  as  the  land  market.  There  are  some  peculiarities:  the  German  law  seems to  apply a 
compensation measure of damages if the builder opts for the periodical payments but switches to a 
market value measure if it decides to redeem the  land. The Italian rule  instead, sets the amount of 
damages  equal  to  double  the  value  of  the  land  occupied;  perhaps an  excess  of care  towards  the 
impairment suffered by the landowner (see note 8 on why this measure is excessive).
Once all these conditions are put together we can see how these laws are crafted in such a way as to 
filter the cases for which building  encroachments’ provisions are applicable. The law strives to keep 
two opportunistic behaviors by both the builder and the landowner at bay. On one hand a strong rule 
favoring the landowner induces her to wait for the builder to accumulate specific investments and then 
try to hold the builder up.  On the other hand a weak rule may induce the builder to venture into the 
construction on other’s land anticipating a non-consensual acquisition of the property. 
These laws all follow the same scheme: by default they attempt to defend landowner’s interests with a 
property rule I and only if i) the landowner behaves negligently or opportunistically (she “forgets” to 
seek ejection in a timely manner and asks unreasonable compensation) and ii) the builder proves the 
encroachment is an unintentional mistake (she proofs emanation and her good-faith) then they switch to 
rules that allow for a non-consensual transfer of the land to the builder. 
It is in this last part of the scheme where we see the great variation among the laws. After the switch 
takes place, laws differ widely in the type of rules they implement and the way they assess damages. 
Most laws include rules II (Swiss, German, Norwegean American), some a more vigorous variant of it 
that is the Rule VII (Italian and Portuguese) some (German and Norwegian) have also a put-option 
style rule VI, Italian law even embeds a stronger variant of the put-option rule (rule VIII) and at least 
one (Swiss law) also has a property rule III17. Why is this the case? Which one is more efficient? And 
which one best fulfils our normative equity criteria?
Accepting our normative efficiency criterion (that states that the builder is the most efficient chooser), 
all national laws that embed in one way or another a rule II produce the highest total payoffs. Rule II 
however ranks middle ground under an equity point of view as it penalizes somewhat the landowner in 
17 we should not forget that the doctrine of  adverse possession, that recognizes a rule III after n years of  continuous open 
and hostile  possession lays in the background of  all the rules mentioned here. See further in section 4.1 on the relation 
between building encroachments and adverse possessiondistributive terms. Rules VII and V would be equally efficient. For what concerns the former rule, we 
have seen laws (such as the Italian and Portuguese) that envisage the lump-sum transfer damages in 
addition to options’s exercise price damages to be paid only if the builder finally acquires the land. The 
initial transfer transforms a  rule II in a rule  VII and biases the  distribution towards the landowner 
without affecting the allocative decision of the builder. As for Rule V we have not encountered any. In 
fact rule  V,  although  efficient,  shoulders  the  distributional  burden  of  the  allocation  totally on  the 
landowner. On equity grounds this seems unacceptable. The absence of rule V is however not the end 
of put options. Rule VI, that mirrors rule V with the put option in the hands of the landowner, is found 
in both the German and Norwegian rules. Under our criterion this rule is less efficient then the three 
seen before, but it is at least distributionally acceptable as it concentrates the gains in the hands of the 
landowner. The Italian law implements rule VIII, a stronger variant of rule VI, On distributive ground, 
both rule VI and VIII are  more preferable  than  rule II and this might explain why they surface  as 
competing rules in the Italian German and Norwegian  systems. Rule III is only applied in the border 
cases  of  minimal  encroachments  although  as  we  will  see  shortly,  rule  III  lays  somewhat  in  the 
background of all rules as it intervenes in case of adverse possession once the statutes of limitations 
expire.
4.1 Building encroachments and adverse possession 
Before moving to the conclusions it is necessary to clarify how cases of building encroachments stand 
against other fundamental cornerstones of property law: the doctrine  of adverse possession and -its 
equivalent in civil law systems- the doctrine of usucaption. By the virtues of adverse possession, most 
property laws allow long-standing, persistent encroachers to acquire title of land after some time has 
elapsed without the actual owner having actively sought to regain legitimate control of the property.18 
The  law thus  already provides  a  mean  –albeit rough-  of resolving  conflicts  arising  from  building 
encroachments: the landowner must prevail by mean of a property rule I until the statute of limitations 
under the doctrine of adverse possession shifts the entitlement to the builder and enforces it through a 
property rule III. In between these two distant and opposite outcomes of the conflict, civil codes and 
common law provide smoother tools of addressing building encroachments. 
Inverted accession or other similar doctrines addressing  building encroachments differ from adverse 
possession in many ways:  first, building  encroachments are applicable only to structures emanating 
from  an adjoin land whereas adverse possession has much broader applications. Second,  the time-
length  is  considerably  shorter  (few  months  against  multiple  years).  Third,  good  faith  and  other 
conditions must be  fulfilled in order for building  encroachments’ doctrines to apply whereas under 
18 The doctrine of adverse possession is a common core principle in most property laws (Mattei, 2000): After a number of 
years of actual, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile possession (Miceli andSirmans, 1995) the law assigns 
the title of land to the trespasser. Adverse possession is not a simple statue of limitations that isolates the encroachment from 
action of  the legitimate owner but it is also a transfer of  title from the owner to the encroacher (see Miceli andSirmans, 
1995; Stake, 2001). There exist a considerable variation among national laws on the  time-length: the term is 5 years in 
California , 12 years in England, 20 years in many countries including Italy and much of  the  US, 30 years in Luisiana, 
France and Germany (Netter et al., 1986). adverse possession good faith at most triggers shorter statutes of limitations.19 Fourth, while adverse 
possession is an abrupt switch from a rule I to a rule III, building encroachments make a wider use of 
liability rules. Foremost the scopes of the two doctrines diverge: while adverse possession is a tool that   
-inter alia- clears titles and triggers the productive use of land (Miceli andSirmans, 1995; Baker et al., 
2001), remedies to building  encroachments are  measures meant at conciliating  the  incentive  of the 
landowner to hold-up the builder with its legitimate claim of not being made worse off by the builder’s 
negligent trespass.
5 Conclusions
Building encroachments represent a peculiar niche of property law. If ownership is fully enforced, then 
the building  must be taken down; but if the building is kept standing, then the encroachment is not 
addressed and property is undermined. In this context both parties may behave opportunistically: the 
builder  may try  to  build  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  non-consensual  transfer  of  property and  the 
landowner may be tempted to wait and see the builder accumulating specific investments in the hope of 
holding  her  up later on. This tension has stimulated  authorities to  come  up with a  range  of legal 
remedies that explore almost entirely the spectrum of Ayresian’s optional rules.
All laws considered have in common a filtering mechanism that try to screen and prevent the strategic 
use of encroachments by both parties to the conflict. These filters are based on some combinations of 
the following requirements: i) good faith (the builder must ignore she is building on other’s land); ii) 
the condition that ejectment is granted if the landowner asks it timely (the builder must stop building if 
the landowner asks so within a limited period from the beginning of the construction), iii) the condition 
that  the  investment  is  not  negligible  or  that  builder’s  investment  is  not  inferior  to  landowner’s 
impairment and iv) the condition that the building emanates from the builder’s land. If these conditions 
are not met, then the encroachment is always addressed simply with a property rule I that fully restores 
landowner’s rights. If conditions are met then different national statutes take different routes. Why do 
we  see  this degree of  variety?  Our  answer is that the  variety spurs from the  tension  between the 
allocative  and  the  distributional  concerns of  the  authority.  On  allocative  ground,  holding  true  the 
normative criterion that builders generally have  more speculative  evaluations of the land, we prefer 
rules where  the  builder  chooses the  final  allocation  of  the  land.  On  equity ground  however,  the 
inclination of lawmakers is to let the landowner to be fully compensated; the landowner after all, has 
been the passive subject of the encroachment. In allocative terms rules II, V and VII are more efficient 
than rules IV,  VI and  VIII. Least efficient are  the  two  property rules.  However,  on  distributional 
grounds, a rule VIII is preferable to a Rule VI that is in turn preferable to a rule I and so on (see Figure 
2). On distributional grounds we can thus justify the implementation of put option rules in some of the 
rules we have seen; quite an oddity in property law.
Efficient allocation  or just distribution?  This seems to  be  the  irreconcilable  puzzle  that lies at the 
bottom of these different rules. This does not need however to be necessarily the case. To begin with, 
notice that rule  II that is embedded in some of the  rules analyzed here, ranks top in the allocative 
19 There are diverging views on what role the good faith requirement plays in adverse possession. While most scholars reject 
the  idea  that the  applicability of  adverse  possession should depend on  trespasser’s  intent (however  see  Merrill (1985) 
advocating a good-faith standard and Fennell (2006) for an argument in favour of a bad-faith requirement), most judges in 
American courts have constantly made their decision about granting adverse possession depending on the trespasser’s state 
of  mind (Helmholz, 1983) By the same token most adverse possession provisions in civil codes recognize that, in case of 
good  faith  possession,  the  time  requirement  is reduced  at  a  rate  that  varies among  legal  systems  between  one-third 
(Germany and France) and one-half (Italy). ranking  and fairly bad  in the  distributional  ranking. This suggests that,  after all,  rule  II  has been 
correctly  understood  as  being  efficient  but  also  quite  unfair.  Fairer  than  this  –so  the  German 
Norwegean and Italian legislator may have hypothetically thought- there could be rule VI and VIII that 
squeezes distribution further in favor of the landowner but let’s the allocative decision resting in the 
hands of the wrong part. Interestingly, there is a rule that is as favorable to the landowner as rule VI 
without being less efficient than rule II: it is the rule VII, that envisages a transfer from the builder to 
the owner and it is paid regardless of the final builder’s decision over the allocation of the land. We find 
traces of this rule in the Portuguese and in the Italian statute (this last one however fails to be efficient 
in the way it determines damages).
The  normative  contribution  of the  paper  can thus  be  synthesized with the Ayresian  suggestion  of 
implementing rule VII more widely whenever we have a party at fault (thus in need to be penalized 
distributionally) that is nevertheless the most efficient chooser.
On the positive side, the modest accomplishments of the present paper are twofold: it casts light on this 
area of the law, contiguous to adverse possession although far less explored by scholars, and it spots 
some put-option rules in the context of property law, the very existence of which has been –the word 
fits well- ruled out by leading property scholars.6 Appendix 1: Derivation of first normative criterion
The resent appendix follows closely the derivation of the convexity result in Ayres & Goldbart (2001).
Because of the put-call parity proprieties of options20 the equation of the total payoffs for rules with the 
builder as the chooser (rule II/V) can be also rewritten as 
(1)
Note that µL is  the exercise price,  is the value of the call option, µB is the average 
builder’s evaluation of the entitlement and  is the value of the put-option. 
By the same token the equation of total payoffs for rules for which the landowner is the chooser can be 
rewritten as:
(2)
we have now two equations, (1) and (2) that describe the relative efficiency in terms of total expected 
payoffs of the two sets of rules: the builder as the chooser one and the landowner as the chooser one. 
Here above there are the four equivalent conditions upon which (1) is greater than (2); that is to say that 
Rules II, V and VII produce larger aggregate payoffs than rules IV, VI and VIII. Conditions (a) and (c) 
suggest that the relative efficiency of the rules crucially depends upon the variance of the distribution 
of f(vB) and f(vL), that is to say that, the more the valuation of the builder is speculative relative to the 
valuation of the landowner, the more the rules that give the option to the builder are more likely to 
produce higher aggregate payoffs. 
Conditions (b) and (d) suggest how neither the mean evaluation nor the difference in mean is relevant 
to determine which type of rules is more efficient. To see why notice that (b) where the landowner has 
an higher mean seems to imply the likelihood that she is the more efficient chooser while (d) seems to 
hold the opposite. Since these are equivalent conditions both cannot be true. As it turns out, neither 
20 Put–call parity defines a relationship between the price of a call option and a put option - both having the same underlier, 
strike price and expiration date (Stoll, 1969). The rule can be generally stated as call + exercise price = put + underlying 
asset. See also Knoll and Center (2002).intuition is true because the values of the options at the other end of the inequality also change in ways 
that offset the direct impact of the change in litigants.21 To see how, notice that if the mean evaluation 
of the builder increases relative to the one of the landowner so–other things equal- the value of both the 
put option in the hand of the builder and the call in the hand of the landowner must increase as well. If 
instead it is the mean evaluation of the landowner to gain a head, then the call option in the hand of the 
landowner gains further in the money and the put option of the builder decreases in value. Therefore if 
in the left hand side of (b), µL increases vis-à-vis µB, so does the call option  in 
respect to 
To  conclude:  the  fundamental  findings  of  the  Ayres  and  Goldbart  (2001)  characterization  of  the 
optional law are two: first, seemingly opposite rules containing put and call (like the II and V) lead to 
identical solutions in terms of aggregate allocative efficiency and vary only as a matter of distribution 
among the parties22 and –second- the variance of parties’ evaluations of the entitlement is the most 
important factor in assessing which rule is likely to achieve higher levels of aggregate payoffs.
21 More than this: the two inequalities are actually equivalent. The rigorous demonstration that is beyond the scope of the 
present article is available in the appendix of Ayres and Goldbart (2001).
22  The  decoupling of  efficiency concerns from the  allocative concerns is the  most impressive  achievement among the 




Nul ne peut être contraint de céder sa propriété, si ce n'est pour cause d'utilité publique, et moyennant 
une juste et préalable indemnité. l
Article 555 (Loi no 60-464 du 17 mai 1960)
 Lorsque  les plantations, constructions et ouvrages ont été  faits par un tiers et avec  des matériaux 
appartenant à ce dernier, le propriétaire du fonds a le droit, sous réserve des dispositions de l'alinéa 4, 
soit d'en conserver la propriété, soit d'obliger le tiers à les enlever. Si le propriétaire du fonds exige la 
suppression des constructions, plantations et ouvrages, elle est exécutée aux frais du tiers, sans aucune 
indemnité pour lui ; le tiers peut, en outre, être condamné à des dommages-intérêts pour le préjudice 
éventuellement subi  par  le  propriétaire  du  fonds.  Si  le  propriétaire  du  fonds  préfère  conserver  la 
propriété des constructions, plantations et ouvrages, il doit, à son choix  rembourser au tiers, soit une 
somme égale à celle dont le fonds a augmenté de valeur, soit le coût des matériaux  et le prix de la 
main-d'oeuvre  estimés à  la  date  du  remboursement,  compte  tenu  de  l'état  dans lequel  se  trouvent 
lesdites constructions, plantations et ouvrages. Si les plantations, constructions et ouvrages ont été faits 
par un tiers évincé qui n'aurait pas été condamné, en raison de sa bonne foi, à la restitution des fruits, le 
propriétaire ne pourra exiger la suppression desdits ouvrages, constructions et plantations, mais il aura 
le choix de rembourser au tiers l'une ou l'autre des sommes visées à l'alinéa précédent.
7.2 Spanish rule
Codice civil derecho civil de cosas
Artículo 362. El que edifica, planta o siembra de mala fe en terreno ajeno, pierde lo edificado, plantado 
o sembrado, sin derecho a indemnización.
Artículo 363.El dueño del terreno en que se haya edificado, plantado o sembrado con mala fe puede 
exigir la demolición de la obra o que se arranque la plantación y siembra, reponiendo las cosas a su 
estado primitivo o a costa del que edificó, plantó o sembró.
Artículo 364.  Cuando haya  habido mala  fe, no sólo por parte del  que edifica, siembra  o planta en 
terreno ajeno, sino también por parte del dueño de éste, los derechos de uno y otro serán los mismos 
que tendrían si hubieran procedido ambos de buena fe. Se entiende haber mala fe por parte del dueño 
siempre que el hecho se hubiere ejecutado a su vista, ciencia y paciencia, sin oponerse.
Artículo 365. Si los materiales, plantas o semillas pertenecen a un tercero que no ha procedido de mala 
fe, el dueño del terreno deberá responder de su valor subsidiariamente y en el solo caso de que el que 
los empleó no tenga bienes con que pagar. No tendrá lugar esta disposición si el propietario usa del 
derecho que le concede el artículo 363.
7.3 Italian rule 
Codice Civile, Libro III, Della Proprietà
Art. 938 Occupazione di porzione di fondo attiguo Se  nella  costruzione  di  un  edificio si  occupa  in  buona  fede  una  porzione  del  fondo  attiguo,  e  il 
proprietario di questo non fa opposizione entro tre mesi   dal giorno in cui ebbe inizio la costruzione, 
l'autorità  giudiziaria,  tenuto  conto  delle  circostanze,  può    attribuire  al  costruttore  la  proprietà 
dell'edificio e del suolo occupato. Il costruttore e tenuto a pagare al proprietario del suolo il doppio del 
valore della superficie occupata, oltre il risarcimento dei danni.
7.4 Swiss Rule 
Code Civil Suisse
Art. 674 Constructions empiétant sur le fonds d'autrui
(1) Les constructions et autres ouvrages qui empiètent sur le fonds voisin restent partie intégrante de 
l'autre fonds, lorsque le propriétaire de celui-ci est au bénéfice d'un droit réel. (2) Ces empiétements 
peuvent être inscrits comme servitudes au registre foncier. (3) Lorsque le propriétaire lésé, après avoir 
eu connaissance de l'empié- tement, ne s'y est pas opposé en temps utile, l'auteur des constructions et 
autres  ouvrages  peut  demander,  s'il  est  de  bonne  foi  et si  les  cir-  constances le  permettent,  que 




Artigo 1343. Prolongamento de edifício por terreno alheio. 
(1) Quando na construção de um edifício em terreno próprio se ocupe, de boa fé, uma parcela de 
terreno  alheio,  o  construtor  pode  adquirir  a  propriedade  do  terreno  ocupado,  se  tiverem 
decorrido três meses a contar do início da ocupação, sem oposição do proprietário, pagando o 
valor do terreno e reparando o prejuízo causado, designadamente o resultante da depreciação 
eventual  do terreno restante. (2) É aplicável o disposto no número anterior relativamente a 
qualquer direito real de terceiro sobre o terreno ocupado.
7.6 Norwegean Rule
Norwegian Act No. 15 of 16th June 1961 § 11
§ 11. Hus eller anna byggverk som ulovleg står såleis at noko av det er inne på granneeigedom, har 
grannen krav på vert bortteke eller retta opp. I tilfelle då dette kom til å valda så store utlegg eller tap 
elles  at  det klårt stod  i  mishøve  til  gagnet,  og  det  ikkje  er  noko  nemnande  å  leggja  eigaren  av 
byggverket til last, kan det gjerast unnatak frå rettingsskyldnaden mot at grannen får vederlag  som 
ikkje må setjast mindre enn skaden eller ulempa.
       Var byggverket frå fyrst av sett ulovleg inn på granneeigedom, må vederlaget for rett til å ha det 
ståande til vanleg ikkje setjast mindre enn vinninga av innpåbygginga.
       Vert byggverket retta oppatt eller flytt eller går det til grunne, fell retten over granneeigedomen 
bort.
7.7 German rule
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. BGB German Civil Code 2002
§ 912 Überbau; Duldungspflicht(1) Hat der Eigentümer eines Grundstücks bei der Errichtung eines Gebäudes über die Grenze gebaut, 
ohne dass ihm Vorsatz oder grobe Fahrlässigkeit zur Last fällt, so hat der Nachbar den Überbau zu 
dulden, es sei denn, dass er vor oder sofort nach der Grenzüberschreitung Widerspruch erhoben hat. (2) 
Der  Nachbar  ist durch  eine  Geldrente  zu  entschädigen.  Für  die  Höhe  der  Rente  ist die  Zeit der 
Grenzüberschreitung maßgebend.
§ 913 Zahlung der Überbaurente
(1)  Die  Rente  für  den  Überbau  ist dem  jeweiligen  Eigentümer  des  Nachbargrundstücks von  dem 
jeweiligen Eigentümer des anderen Grundstücks zu entrichten. (2) Die Rente ist jährlich im Voraus zu 
entrichten.
§ 914 Rang, Eintragung und Erlöschen der Rente
(1) Das Recht auf die Rente geht allen Rechten an dem belasteten Grundstück, auch den älteren, vor. Es 
erlischt mit der Beseitigung des Überbaus (2) Das Recht wird nicht in das Grundbuch eingetragen. Zum 
Verzicht auf das Recht sowie zur Feststellung  der Höhe der Rente durch Vertrag  ist die Eintragung 
erforderlich.(3) Im Übrigen finden die Vorschriften Anwendung, die für eine zugunsten des jeweiligen 
Eigentümers eines Grundstücks bestehende Reallast gelten.
§ 915 Abkauf
(1) Der Rentenberechtigte kann jederzeit verlangen, dass der Rentenpflichtige ihm gegen Übertragung 
des Eigentums an dem überbauten Teil des Grundstücks den Wert ersetzt, den dieser Teil zur Zeit der 
Grenzüberschreitung  gehabt  hat.  Macht  er  von  dieser  Befugnis  Gebrauch,  so  bestimmen  sich  die 
Rechte und Verpflichtungen beider Teile nach den Vorschriften über den Kauf. (2) Für die Zeit bis zur 
Übertragung des Eigentums ist die Rente fortzuentrichten.
7.8 American rule 
2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners § 57 - Ejectment; equitable relief (Mayer, 2007)
An encroachment on the  land  of another  may support an  action  of ejectment23, unless a  different 
remedy is expressly provided by statute24.
An owner whose land is subjected to an encroachment may seek equitable relief against its further 
maintenance  or  to  compel  its  removal25,  unless  the  encroachment  is  not  removable  without 
considerable expense26, even though no actual damage is sustained27.
23 Del.—Haitsch v. Duffy, 10 Del. Ch. 280, 92 A. 249 (1914). Wis.—Fisher v. Goodman, 205 Wis. 286, 237 N.W. 93 (1931).
24 D.C.—Frizzell v. Murphy, 19 App. D.C. 440 (App. D.C. 1902).
25 Iowa—Miller v. McClelland, 173 N.W. 910, 10 A.L.R. 1317 (Iowa 1919). Mass.—Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 59 
N.E.2d 712 (1945)
26 Cal.—Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal. App. 2d 30, 221 P.2d 337 (3d Dist. 1950). Okla.—Kasner v. Reynolds, 1954 OK 56, 268 P.
2d 864 (Okla. 1954).
27 Mass.—Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N.E. 278 (1897).An owner may be required to remove a structure28 or a part of a structure29, which encroaches on 
adjoining property. However, under certain circumstances, as where the encroachment is slight30, there 
is no evidence that the defendant acted willfully31, the encroachment was due mainly to a predecessor 
in title  of the defendant32, or the burden of removing  the encroachment substantially outweighs the 
benefit33, an order to remove the encroachment is improper34. Rather, the court may award damages35, 
order defendants to take steps to rectify any problems caused by the encroachment36, and compensate 
the plaintiff properly for easements on its property37. A statute may allow a court to require one who 
constructs  an  encroachment  on  land  in  good  faith  to  obtain  a  servitude  upon  payment  of 
compensation38. 
2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners § 57 - Damages - Amount and measure 
The measure of damages varies with the nature of the encroachment as permanent or temporary, and 
the correct rule to be followed is that rule which will attain the amount of damage most accurately. 
Generally, a landowner is entitled to damages in an amount that will compensate for the loss sustained 
on account of the encroachment39. An owner is not entitled to an award of compensatory damages in 
excess of the loss40.
Where the encroachment is of such a permanent nature that defendant is not required to remove it, the 
measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property before and the value of the 
28 N.H.—Pugliese v. Town of Northwood Planning Bd., 119 N.H. 743, 408 A.2d 113 (1979). N.Y.—Hedden v. Bohling, 112 
A.D.2d 23, 490 N.Y.S.2d 391 (4th Dep't 1985).
29 Or.—Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 269 Or. 174, 523 P.2d 1018 (1974).
30 Christopher v. Rosse, 91 A.D.2d 768, 458 N.Y.S.2d 8 (3d Dep't 1982).
31 Minn.—Olson v. Lindberg, 286 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1979). N.Y.—Christopher v. Rosse, 91 A.D.2d 768, 458 N.Y.S.2d 8 
(3d Dep't 1982).
32 Or.—Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 269 Or. 174, 523 P.2d 1018 (1974).
33 Ill.—Terwelp v. Sass, 111 Ill. App. 3d 133, 66 Ill. Dec. 878, 443 N.E.2d 804 (4th Dist. 1982). N.Y.—Christopher v. Rosse, 
91 A.D.2d 768, 458 N.Y.S.2d 8 (3d Dep't 1982). Or.—Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, Independent Order of  Odd Fellows, 
269 Or. 174, 523 P.2d 1018 (1974).
34 Ill.—Mari-Mann Herb Co., Inc. v. Borchers, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 159 Ill. Dec. 827, 576 N.E.2d 496 (4th Dist. 1991). 
Or.—Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 269 Or. 174, 523 P.2d 1018 (1974).
35 Ill.—Terwelp v. Sass, 111 Ill. App. 3d 133, 66 Ill. Dec. 878, 443 N.E.2d 804 (4th Dist. 1982). N.Y.—Christopher v. Rosse, 
91 A.D.2d 768, 458 N.Y.S.2d 8 (3d Dep't 1982).
36 Or.—Seid v. Ross, 120 Or. App. 564, 853 P.2d 308 (1993).
37 Ill.—Mari-Mann Herb Co., Inc. v. Borchers, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 159 Ill. Dec. 827, 576 N.E.2d 496 (4th Dist. 1991). 
Or.—Seid v. Ross, 120 Or. App. 564, 853 P.2d 308 (1993).
38 La.—Porterfield v. Spurgeon, 379 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 1235 (La. 1980).
39 Cal.—Richard v. Mead, 141 Cal. App. 2d 866, 297 P.2d 680 (2d Dist. 1956). Mich.—Sokel v. Nickoli, 356 Mich. 460, 97 
N.W.2d 1 (1959). W.Va.—Kincaid v. Morgan, 188 W. Va. 452, 425 S.E.2d 128 (1992).
40 N.Y.—Jenss Bldg. Corp. v. Nikitas, 20 A.D.2d 616, 244 N.Y.S.2d 875 (4th Dep't 1963).property after the encroachment41. Value may be based on the property's reasonable rental value42. The 
rules governing the measure of damages in such cases are not completely rigid and may be modified to 
suit the particular situation, the correct rule to be followed being that rule which will attain the amount 
of damage most accurately43. Damages may be based on the fact that a landowner was delayed in using 
land and forced to buy other land by reason of the encroachment of a building from a neighboring lot44 
(Mayer, 2007, § 57).
41 Md.—Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 233 Md. 174, 195 A.2d 682 (1963). N.Y.—Generalow v. Steinberger, 131 A.D.2d 
634, 517 N.Y.S.2d 22 (2d Dep't 1987).
42 Mont.—Goodover v. Lindey's Inc., 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.2d 765 (1992).
43 Utah—Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099 (1936). Tex.—Allen v. Virginia Hill 
Water Supply Corp., 609 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. Tyler 1980).
44 Conn.—Ferrigno v. Odell, 113 Conn. 420, 155 A. 639 (1931).8 Bibliography
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